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The free movement of capital is one of the four
freedoms set forth in the Treaty of Rome. Although
good progress has been made with respect to
monetary integration, culminating in the
commencement of the European Monetary Union, the
introduction of the euro in most of the European
Union (EU) countries in 1999 and the formation of a
European Central Bank, integration of the equity
markets isfarfrom complete. Despite the adoption of
various directives relevant to public investors and
equity trading markets, there is not an integrated
European market enabling issuers to float public
offerings or savers to invest and trade across national
borders in a single market. The persistence of
national equity markets has several causes. One
important factor is the lack of a common equity
culture across Europe. Nevertheless, the time is ripe
for a public securities market that will transcend
national boundaries. All over Europe, governments
are attempting to foster an equity culture for both
ideological and practical reasons. A European equity
market is needed in order to finance the needs of the
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enterprises and peoples of Europe. While laws and
regulators cannot create a market, they can either
impede or foster one. At the very least, regulation can
eliminate anticompetitive practices that inhibit market
development. In addition, securities regulation
designed to protect investors and instill confidence in
the equity markets can change the conduct of issuers
and traders that discourage savers from investing in
equities. These objectives have not and probably
cannot be met through directives of the European
Commission. Quicker and more flexible responses to
developments in the capital markets are required.
This paper will argue that a European Securities and
Exchange Commission (European SEC) is needed to
foster an equity culture throughout Europe and to
develop and administer flexible regulations to govern
a European equity market. The paper will also
discuss some of the programs a European SEC could
undertake.
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A EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
I. NTRoDUCTION
The free movement of capital is one of the four freedoms set
forth in the Treaty of Rome.' Although significant progress has been
made with respect to monetary integration, culminating in the
commencement of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the
introduction of the euro in most of the European Union (EU)
countries in 1999 and the formation of a European Central Bank,
integration of the equity markets is far from complete.2 Despite the
adoption of various directives relevant to public investors and equity
trading markets, there is not an integrated European market enabling
issuers to float public offerings or savers to invest and trade across
national borders in a single market.'
The persistence of national equity markets has several causes.
One important factor is the lack of a common legal framework
encouraging an equity culture across Europe.4  In the United
Kingdom corporate finance is equity based.5 By contrast, on the
continent corporate finance depends upon internally generated funds
and bank loans.6 Further, continental employees stand on an equal
footing with shareholders as claimants on corporate profits.7 These
corporate law differences make it difficult to create a harmonized
regulatory regime to protect investors.' In addition, equity market
integration is discouraged by competition and political rivalry among
national stock exchanges.9 Another impediment to a pan-European
equity market is the barrier to cross border investment by pension
funds and insurance companies.'0
Despite the impediments to a European equity market, the
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See generally E. Philip Davis, Institutionalization and EMU: Implications for
European Financial Markets, 2 INT'L FIN. 33 (1999).
3. See Financial Services: Implementing the Framework For Financial Markets:
Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6 [hereinafter Financial Services Action Plan].
4. See Davis, supra note 2, at 37.
5. See Return of the Absent Owners, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at S5.
6. See RICHARD M. BuxBAUM & KLAUS J. HopT, 4 LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE
BusINESs ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN
EUROPE AND THE USA 192-93 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., Integration Through Law
Series 1988).
7. See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and
Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 203, 204 (1994).
8. See id. at212.
9. See infra Part II.E.
10. See infra Part I.B.7.
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time is ripe for a public securities market that will transcend national
boundaries. All over Europe, governments are attempting to foster
an equity culture for both ideological and practical reasons.
Government planning and ownership of industry has fallen out of
favor coincident with the collapse of Communism. In any event,
ever increasing budget deficits are no longer sustainable by
governments. One result of this political shift to a free market
ideology coupled with a practical need to reduce government
spending has been massive privatizations of government owned
assets.1' An additional impetus to the creation of an equity culture is
that family owned businesses have a need for outside capital in order
to retire aging owners, but banks are no longer able to fill all of the
capital needs of many businesses because access to larger pools of
capital are required in a global marketplace. 2 State and corporate
pension fund systems are under severe economic pressure due to
demographics. 3  Therefore, alternative private sector pension
schemes, based to some extent on equity investments, are under
consideration. 4 In short, a European equity market is needed in
order to finance the needs of the enterprises and peoples of Europe.
While laws and regulators cannot create a market, they can
either impede or foster one. At the very least, regulation can
eliminate anticompetitive practices that inhibit market development.
In addition, securities regulation designed to protect investors and
instill confidence in the equity markets can change conduct by issuers
and traders that discourages savers from investing in equities. These
objectives have not and probably cannot be met through directives of
the European Commission. Quicker and more flexible responses to
developments in the capital markets are required. This paper will
argue that a European Securities and Exchange Commission
(European SEC) is needed to foster an equity culture throughout
Europe and to develop and administer flexible regulations to govern a
European equity market. The paper will also discuss some of the
programs a European SEC could undertake.
11. See, e.g., Catherine Curran Butcher, Telecommunications in the European Union,
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 451 (1996).
12. See Deborah Ball, IPO Boom Shows Entrepreneurial Spirit Has Reached Italy,
Bucking Tradition, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at B7; John Glover, Beyond Family
Capitalism, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 31, 1995, at 63.
13. See GROUP OF TEN, THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF AGING
POPULATIONS 25-30 (1998) (visited Sept. 19, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/gten04.htm>.
14. See id. at 41-42, 44.
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II. EU CAPITAL MARKETS INITIATIVEs
A. General Objectives
The Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundation for the
European Communities (EC) in 1958, was designed to remove all
restrictions on the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital within the EU. 5 This plan was furthered by the EC White
Paper of 1985, which set forth a program for creating a single
European market by 1992. The single market was envisioned as
expansive and flexible, to ensure that resources, including capital and
investment, would flow into the areas of greatest economic
advantage. 6  National regulators would continue to play a
supervisory role, but financial services would be liberalized by
putting into effect EU-wide minimum standards which would
supersede former national regulations. 7 The White Paper also
included a timetable for the adoption of securities law directives."
The White Paper was then implemented by the Single European Act
(SEA) amendments to the Treaty of Rome, which encouraged and
facilitated the use of directives to harmonize the laws of Member
States. 9 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Maastricht
Treaty, which came into effect in 1993 then provided for an
economic and monetary union including a common currency."
Nevertheless, the TEU also introduced the principle of subsidiarity
which put a brake on further harmonization of financial law.2"
The objective of these efforts was to remove technical
barriers that either added costs or restricted entry into particular
markets, thereby impeding the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital. This open internal market was intended to give
consumers access to a wide range of financial products, without
regard to the country from which they were provided, to make the
financial services sector more competitive and capable of utilizing
economies of scale and to provide discipline in the conduct of
15. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
3(c), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC treaty].
16. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission of the
European Council, COM(85)310 final at 8 [hereinafter White Paper].
17. See id. 103.
18. See id. Annex at 26-27.
19. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986).
20. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247
(1 992) [hereinafter TEU].
21. See id. art. 36.
1999]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
economic policies. It was hoped that a single financial market would
encourage rational investment and the efficient allocation of savings
throughout the EU. The single market envisioned was also supposed
to create an attractive and competitive integrated financial system for
both EU and non-EU businesses.2
It was recognized that the abolition of anticompetitive
practices was not sufficient to create a common financial market.
There was a need for EU-wide rules to underpin the stability of the
financial system and to provide a satisfactory level of protection for
consumers. The mechanism chosen for integration of the financial
markets was a series of directives to harmonize essential standards
throughout the EU and to enable financial regulators to practice home
country control, but oblige them to honor principles of mutual
recognition.
The first step in creating a single market in financial services
was the liberalization of capital movements, giving both individuals
and firms the freedom to invest capital anywhere in the EU: for
example, the right to open a bank account in any Member State.23
Although this freedom allowed an investor to take the initiative and
approach suppliers of financial services, it did not insure that the
suppliers were free to establish and solicit business from potential
investors in every EU country. In order to create an EU-wide capital
market that would not imperil the stability of the financial system, the
European Commission determined that a level playing field should
be established for financial suppliers and users: for example, uniform
rules for stock exchange membership and harmonized capital
adequacy requirements for banks and securities firms. A series of
directives eliminating technical barriers to cross-border securities
offerings and trading was therefore adopted.
There are four groups of financial law directives which relate
to the efforts to develop a single securities market in the EU. These
groups consist of directives on financial disclosure, directives
covering public securities offerings and stock exchange listings,
directives regulating trading markets, and directives regulating
financial intermediaries which will be addressed in separate sections
below. Another way to categorize the laws designed to create a
comprehensive scheme of securities regulation is to examine what
rights were granted to and what obligations were imposed upon each
of the three groups affected by securities laws: issuers seeking
22. See White Paper, supra note 16, 125-27.
23. This objective was accomplished by the adoption of the directive liberalizing
controls on capital movements. See Council Directive No. 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5.
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capital, savers seeking investment opportunities and financial
intermediaries.
Despite the ambitious legislative program set forth in the SEA
and subsequently followed, the European Commission has
recognized that EU financial markets remain segmented and
businesses and consumers continue to be deprived of direct access to
cross-border financial institutions.24 However, with the introduction
of the euro, a window of opportunity has opened for integrating
financial services.2' The Commission therefore has set forth an
action plan for improving the single market in financial services that
advocates five imperatives for action, as follows:
" the EU should be endowed with a legislative apparatus
capable of responding to new regulatory challenges;
* any remaining capital market fragmentation should be
eliminated, thereby reducing the cost of capital raised on
EU markets;
* users and suppliers of financial services should be able to
exploit freely the commercial opportunities offered by a
single financial market, while benefiting from a high level
of consumer protection;
* closer co-ordination of supervisory authorities should be
encouraged; and
" an integrated EU infrastructure should be developed to
underpin retail and wholesale financial transactions.26
B. Financial Disclosure and Company Law
An important series of directives was adopted setting forth
minimum standards for the protection of shareholders of all EU
companies. These directives also protect creditors, including
bondholders and suppliers. For the most part, these directives cover
both public and private companies and regulate financial disclosure
and related matters. The First Directive on Company Law27 provides
a system of publicity for all companies and requires disclosure of
information on their basic corporate documents, officers, and balance
sheet items, such as paid-up capital and profit and loss accounts. The
Second Directive on Company Law28 applies only to public
24. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 3.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Council Directive No. 68/151, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8.
28. Council Directive No. 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1, amended by Council Directive
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companies and specifies minimum capital requirements, lays down
certain restrictions on issued share reacquisitions and provides for
shareholder preemptive rights. The Second Directive on Company
Law tends to impede rather than foster public offerings because of its
insistence on par value shares and pre-emptive rights. Further, these
restrictions make listing ordinary shares rather than Depository
Receipts on U.S. stock exchanges difficult and expensive.29
The Fourth Directive on Annual Accounts3° requires that
annual financial statements be published that give a "true and fair"
view of a company's assets, liabilities, financial position and profit
and loss. Two formats for the balance sheet and four formats for the
profit and loss account are permitted. Guidelines are provided for the
presentation of standard minimum footnote disclosure. The Sixth
Directive on Divisions31 requires that certain types of restructuring be
approved at an annual meeting and affords shareholders
informational and fair treatment rights. The Seventh Directive on
Consolidated Accounts32  specifies when accounts have to be
consolidated and the procedures for doing so. The Eighth Directive
on Auditor Qualification33 lays down minimum educational and
professional qualifications for auditors of public companies and
provides that auditors should be persons of good repute. It does not,
however, establish standards of auditor independence. The Eleventh
No. 92/101 1992 O.J. (L 347) 64.
29. Par value and pre-emptive rights generally are inappropriate for public companies.
When DaimlerChrysler listed in New York, these restrictions, embedded in German law,
created serious problems. See generally Noelle Knox, NYSE Expects More Foreign Stocks;
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 1999; DaimlerChrysler's New Global Share Threatens ADRs,
INvFsTMENr DEALERS' DIG., Nov. 23, 1998; Thomas S. Mulligan, Wall Street, California
Auto Giant Begins Trading Today In New Stock Format Securities: Newly Created
Diamlerchrysler Has Spawned The 'Global Share, ' An Alternative To The ADR, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1998, at Cl; Tracy Corrigan, DaimleChrysler To Start Trading: Global Equities
Jury Still Out On The Share Structure, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1998, at 27.
30. Council Directive No. 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11, amended by Council Directive
No. 83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1, amended by Council Directive No. 84/569, 1984 O.J. (L
314) 28 (revising the amounts expressed in ECUS), amended by Council Directive 1989 No.
89/666 O.J. (L 395) 36, amended by Council Directive No. 90/604, 1990 O.J. (L 317)
(revising annual accounts), amended by Council Directive No. 90/605, 1990 O.J. (L 317) 60
(revising annual accounts), amended by Council Directive No. 94/8, 1994 O.J. (L 82) 33
(revising the amount expressed in ECUS).
31. Council Directive No. 82/891, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47.
32. Council Directive No. 83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1, amended by Council Directive
No. 89/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36, amended by Council Directive No. 90/604, 1990 O.J. (L
317) 57 (1990) (amending consolidated accounts as concerns the exemptions for small and
medium sized companies and the publication of accounts in ECUS), amended by Council
Directive No. 90/605, 1990 O.J. (L 317) 60 (amending consolidated accounts as regards the
scope of those Directives).
33. Council Directive No. 84/253, 1984 O.J. (L 126) 20.
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Directive on Company Law34 standardizes the information a Member
State can require a local branch of a foreign company to disclose so
that branches of foreign companies can be treated in the same manner
as domestic branches.
Implementation of the EU disclosure and accounting
directives did have an impact on privately owned companies that had
no obligation to publicly report their assets or earnings. However,
these directives have had little or no effect on financial disclosure by
public companies. Since the directives allow considerable choice,
EU accounting principles cannot be considered up to an international
standard." Previously, the European Commission basically
recognized its lack of any effective mandate in accounting standards
policy by putting its weight behind the international harmonization
process of the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC).36 This expressed deference to the IASC was related to the
announcement in July 1995 by IASC and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) of a four year
program of improvements to standards and the development of new
standards (IAS) that would be endorsed by IOSCO and
recommended to its members.37 More recently, the European
Commission has recognized that it must map out a strategy for
enhancing the comparability of financial reporting in Europe, amend
and update the Fourth and Seventh Directives and address the issue
of auditing standards.38
In the meantime, many world-class European companies have
been reconciling their accounting statements to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) of the United States in order to list on
a U.S. stock exchange or raise capital from U.S. investors.39 While
34. Council Directive No. 89/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36.
35. See Bob Hagerty, Lack of Comparable Accounting Rules Snarls Europe, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 4, 1992, at A4; David Wailer, Bringing Harmony to the Babel of Community
Accounting Languages, FIN. TIMES, OCT. 16, 1989, at 6.
36. See Bean Counters, Unite!, EcONOMIST, June 10, 1995 at 67, 68. The IASC began
work in 1973 and is comprised of professional accounting bodies throughout the world. In
1989 it published its conceptual framework. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, UNDERSTANDING
IAS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION xvii-xx (1996).
37. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 36, at xxiv.
38. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 7, 23.
39. During 1997, 27 European companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and 22 listed on Nasdaq. In 1999, comparable listing figures were 19 (NYSE) and
13 (Nasdaq). See New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Listed Companies (visited Sept. 13,
1999) <http://www.nyse.com/listed/Euro.hmtl> and NASDAQ, Nasdaq International
Companies (visited Sept. 13, 1999)
<http://www.nasdaq.com/mktofmkts/nonusoutputca0.stm> (the Nasdaq figures were as of
Aug. 31, 1998).
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other European companies have been waiting on the sidelines for the
IASC to complete its harmonization project, hoping that the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will recognize LAS
GAAP in documents filed with the SEC, it is not clear whether or
when the SEC will reach such a determination.4" Further, there is no
European government body in a position effectively to negotiate
these matters with the SEC.
One important directive in the field of company law has not
been passed. The Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive on
Company Law41 deals with the structure of corporate boards and is
highly controversial. It was initially proposed twenty-five years ago
and could easily remain only a proposed directive well into the next
century. The impasse on the Fifth Directive on Company Law is a
product of the different systems of corporate finance and labor
relations that have evolved in the United Kingdom, Germany and
other EU countries.4" Of greatest importance is the historical role of
equity capital in funding and ordering business in the United
Kingdom, in contrast to the role of bank credit or government in
ordering and funding business on the continent. In recent years,
however, large privatizations of government owned enterprises43 and
pressures on banks to increase their capital' have shifted continental
thinking so that businesses and governments are interested in
40. See Lee Berton, All Accountants Soon May Speak the Same Language, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 29, 1995, at A15; Steve Burkholder, FASB in 'Very Good' State, Jenkins Says;
Baker Bill Casts Shadow, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 251, 253-54 (Feb. 13, 1998);
Accounting: IASC Interpretations Panel Issues Draft Guidance on Losses from Devaluation,
69 Banking Rep. (BNA), at 273 (Aug. 11, 1997); IASC Board OKS Financial Instrument
Rules; U.S. Delegation Among Three Abstentions, 72 Banking Rep. (BNA), at 16 (Jan. 4,
1999).
41. Amended Proposal for Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty
Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligation of
Their Organs, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2. A related effort is the proposed Statute for the creation of
a European company. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a
European Company, 1991 O.J. (C 176) 1.
42. See generally THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD
CORPORATIONS (Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Vinsentini eds., 1998).
43. See James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and
United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-18, 49-58 (1995); Cosmo
Graham, Privatization-The United Kingdom Experience, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 185, 190-
192 (1995); Out of Order: Shareholder Rights in France, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at 87.
44. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, a committee of bank supervisory
authorities from the Group of Ten countries proposed new guidance in 1988 for the amount
of capital internationally active banks should hold as a financial cushion. These new rules,
known as the Basle Accord, became fully effective in 1992. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, The
Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 21-22 (1998); Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules For
International Banks And Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 133, 162-163
(1992).
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developing an equity culture. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that legal
regimes will be revised on the continent so that corporations will be
managed for the sole benefit of shareholders rather than also for the
benefit of creditors and employees or that co-determination will be
ended in Germany and other countries. Although the European
Commission has recognized the problems different corporate
governance regimes pose to the development of an EU financial
market, the political difficulties of harmonization are so great that the
European Commission has merely recommended a review of national
codes of corporate governance to identify barriers to the development
of a single market.45
C. Offerings and Listings
A second group of directives establishes standards for
disclosure in public offerings and listings of securities. The
Admissions Directive46 sets forth minimum requirements for the
admission of shares and debt securities on Member State stock
exchanges. The Listing Particulars Directive47 requires that, prior to
being listed on a stock exchange, companies provide investors with a
prospectus containing all information necessary to make an informed
assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and
losses and prospects of the issuer and of the rights attaching to the
securities. The Interim Reports Directive48 imposes an ongoing
requirement on stock exchange listed companies to publish semi-
annual profit and loss reports and developments of significance to
investors. The Public Offer Prospectus Directive49 regulates public
45. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15.
46. Council Directive No. 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, amended by Council Directive
No. 82/148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22. Euro-securities were excluded for policy reasons and trade
in an unregulated market. Todd A. Sulger, Comment, Harmonization of Securities Market
Regulations in the European Union: Is the Price Tag Too High?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221,
225 (1998).
47. Council Directive No. 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1, amended by Council Directive
No. 82/148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22, amended by Council Directive No. 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L
185) 81, (amending the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the
listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities of official stock exchange
listing), amended by Council Directive No. 90/211, 1990 O.J. (L 112) 24, (amending the
mutual recognition of public-offer prospectuses as stock-exchange listing particulars),
amended by Council Directive No. 94/18, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 1, (amending the requirements
for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the
admission of securities of official stock exchange listing, with regard to the obligation to
publish listing particulars).
48. Council Directive No. 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26.
49. Council Directive No. 89/298, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8.
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offerings of transferable securities throughout the EC, either by the
issuer or selling shareholders. Specific items of information
disclosure are mandated and exemptions are provided for small
issues and private placements.
These minimum disclosure standards provide a foundation for
imposing an obligation on securities regulators to recognize the
disclosure regulatory standards of other EU Member States. An
amendment to the Listing Particulars Directive" provides that EU
Member States must recognize stock exchange listing applications of
issuers from other Member States without requiring additional
information, if an application filed simultaneously (or
contemporaneously) is approved by the issuer's home state. The
Second Mutual Recognition Directive5 provides for similar mutual
recognition of any public offer prospectus which has been subject to
scrutiny and approval by a competent authority. The workings of
these directives demonstrate the principles of minimum standards,
mutual recognition and home country control that are basic tenets of
the single market in securities.
The mutual recognition provisions of the listing particulars
and public offer directives held out the promise of creating a single
market in securities and generally improving financial disclosure.
This has not happened, however, due to the rivalries and suspicions
of the European stock exchanges, which will be discussed more fully
in connection with the Investment Services Directive (ISD). It
should be noted that the mutual recognition provisions are very
narrow; they only come into play in the instance of simultaneous or
virtually simultaneous listing applications. There is no obligation for
a stock exchange in one country to list an issuer because it is listed on
an exchange in another EC Member State. In fact, exchanges
commonly insist on a translation of listing particulars and often
impose additional requirements on issuers desiring to list.
The Eurolist project of the Federation of Stock Exchanges in
the EU was supposed to result in more general mutual recognition,
but that project foundered and did not become a meaningful pan-
European market.52 However, two competing models of a pan-
European market now are taking shape. One is EASDAQ, the
European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation,
50. Council Directive No. 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L 185) 81.
51. Council Directive No. 90/211, 1990 O.J. (L 112) 24.
52. See Hal S. Scott, Regulation of the Relationship between European Union Stock
Exchanges: Lessons from the United States, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE
INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 283, 289 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1998)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS].
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which had its first full year of trading in 1997 and was specifically
established to serve the entrepreneurial high growth company sector.
It is governed by a single legal system under Belgium law and the
ISD. The listing prospectus must be at least in English; financial
information must be presented in IAS or U.S. GAAP and there are
quarterly reporting requirements. 3
The other pan-European market is the EURO.NM initiative
which includes the Nouveau March6 in Paris, the Neuer Market in
Germany, the EURO.NMBelgium in Brussels and the NMAX
(Nieuwe Markt) in Amsterdam. This is a multijurisdictional system
that will harmonize the rules and regulations of all these markets and
integrate the markets electronically, to provide high growth
companies with access to international investors. 4 This market also
requires issuers to make active and timely disclosures to investors. In
the Neuer Market, annual reports must contain financial statements
that are presented in IAS, U.S. GAAP or German accounting
standards with reconciliation, share ownership must be published by
the management, quarterly reporting is mandatory and seminars must
be held at least annually for equity analysts."
A common trading platform for European blue chips stocks is
being planned by the Deutshe Borse and the London Stock
Exchange, possibly in conjunction with the Paris Bourse.56 This will
be a multijurisdictional, cross-border joint venture, in which there
will continue to be home country regulation. Harmonized financial
disclosure therefore is not assured. Nevertheless, technology,
competition and the introduction of the euro have sped up the
formation of alliances by stock exchanges and these alliances are
more focused than prior experiments.57
53. See EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS AUTOMATED QUOTATION,
1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARKET AUTHORITY 2, 31 (1998).
54. See DEUTSHE BORSE, A.G., NEUER MARKET 8 (2d ed. 1997).
55. See id. at 5.
56. See Paris To Join Frankfurt-London Stockmarket Alliance, HANDELSBLAT-T, Dec.
21, 1998, at 29; John Carreyrou & Genevieve Oger, Paris Bourse Seeks To Join London,
Frankfurt In Pact, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 13, 1998, at 16; Paris Exchange May Join U.K.,
German Alliance, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 15, 1998, at 15; Suzanne McGee and Silvia
Ascarelli, European Market Link-Up Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998, at Cl.
57. See Paul Arlman, European Equity Markets After the Euro: Competition and
Cooperation Across New Frontiers, 2 INT'L FIN. 139, 142-44 (1999).
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D. Securities Trading
A third group of directives deals with securities trading. The
Major Shareholdings Directive58 requires disclosure to the issuer and
to competent authorities of significant acquisitions or dispositions of
listed securities. The EU Insider Trading Directive59 harmonizes the
law on insider trading by requiring all Member States to adopt
legislation to prohibit insider trading. Of possibly more far reaching
importance than either of these directives is the Proposed Thirteenth
Directive on Company Law6" that would establish minimum
standards for the conduct of takeovers of companies with listed
securities. This directive has been extremely controversial because it
goes to the heart of corporate governance and therefore has not yet
moved forward.
The Major Shareholdings Directive has provided investors
with some information not previously available about the owners of
industry in some countries. This is the type of information which
could be useful to potential bidders in tender offers, but attitudes and
regulatory systems in Europe are quite divergent with regard to
contests for corporate control.
The Insider Trading Directive was adopted in order to
harmonize insider-trading laws throughout the EU, but it has had the
more important effect of causing certain countries to create or change
their securities market regulators. Prior to the EU Insider Trading
Directive the laws in Europe concerning insider trading were not
uniform.61  The EU Insider Trading Directive required Member
States to implement its provisions in their national laws by June 1,
1992. The EU Insider Trading Directive defines "inside information"
to mean "information which has not been made public of a precise
nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to
one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public,
58. Council Directive No. 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
59. Council Directive No. 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 [hereinafter EU Insider
Trading Directive].
60. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8, amended by 1990 O.J. (C 240) 7,
amended by 1997 O.J. (C 378) 11.
61. France was the first European country to regulate insider trading and it did so in
1967. See generally Amy E. Stutz, Note, A New Look at the European Economic
Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 155-167 (1990).
When the EU Insider Trading Directive was passed, insider trading was a criminal offense in
the United Kingdom, but not violative of any statute in Germany. See id. at 155, 161. See
also Ursula C. Pfeil, Comment, Finanzplatz Deutschland: Germany Enacts Insider Trading
Legislation, 11 U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 137 (1996).
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would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the
transferable security or securities in question[.] ' 62
Primary insiders are prohibited from either trading or tipping,
and secondary insiders are prohibited from trading, but are not
subject to the anti-tipping provisions. It is clear that, unlike the U.S.
insider trading laws, determination of illegal trading is based not on
breach of a fiduciary duty, but rather, on possession of non-public
information. The EU Insider Trading Directive lays out broad
guidelines, but Member States may enforce stricter laws.63 in
addition, although the prohibition of insider trading is prescribed for
all Member States of the EU, the penalties are to be determined by
each Member State. The Directive states that the penalties must be
"sufficient to promote compliance with [the] measures."'
The last major market center to adopt the Insider Trading
Directive was Germany, and this delay happened in part because
Germany had no viable regulator to administer this law. Indeed,
Germany was two years late in complying with the EU Insider
Trading Directive.65 When the insider trading regulations were
finally adopted in 1994, they were part of a large, comprehensive
program to develop a fairer and more attractive investment
environment in the German marketplace with centralized regulation
to supersede regulation by the kinder or states. The law created a
new agency, the Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities
Trading (FSA), to administer the Insider Trading Directive and for
other regulatory purposes. The FSA is a federal agency under the
Federal Ministry of Finance.
Although prohibiting insider trading is important, other
market integrity standards for maintaining fair and equitable markets
are also important. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
polices the public securities markets by enforcing a general antifraud
statutory provision66 and provisions outlawing the manipulation of
62. EU Insider Trading Directive, supra note 59, art. 1, § 1.
63. See id., art. 6. The Directive states, in part, that "[e]ach Member State may adopt
provisions more stringent than those laid down by this Directive or additional provisions,
provided that such provisions are applied generally." Id.
64. Id. art. 13.
65. The EU Insider Trading Directive required Member States to adopt insider-trading
laws by June 1992. See Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider
Trading in International Securities Markets by the Reform of Insider Trading Laws under
European Union Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 51, 55 (1995).
When Germany had not responded, the European Commission instituted infringement
proceedings in October of 1992. The insider law was finally passed on July 8, 1994. See id.
at 62-63.
66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1994) and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1998).
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securities prices.67 IOSCO has recommended that securities
regulation should promote trading transparency and detect and deter
manipulation and other unfair trading practices.68 The European
Commission has recognized the need for a directive to address
market manipulation, but this is not a top priority item.69 Another
important omission in the law at the EU level is the regulation of
takeover bids, a gap that effects not only the integrity of securities
markets, but also corporate restructurings across national
boundaries."°
Management of corporations for the benefit of shareholders in
the United Kingdom, in contrast to stakeholder management where
shareholder claims are equal to the claims of creditors and labor on
directors' loyalty on the continent, result in key differences in
European corporate finance systems. These differences account for
the very different legal and business environments for hostile
takeovers and the impediments to the adoption of a directive on
takeovers designed to protect investors.71  Hostile takeovers are
common in London and they are regulated by the Panel on Takeovers
and Mergers, a self-regulatory body which implements the City Code
on Takeover and Mergers (City Code).7' The two most important
principles in the City Code are that the shareholders of an offeree
company must decide whether or not an offer should succeed, and
that all equity holders must be treated equally.73 In addition, after an
offer is communicated to the board, or even if a board has reason to
believe an offer is imminent, the offeree board is prohibited from
taking any action without the approval of shareholders at a general
meeting "which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being
frustrated or in the shareholders being denied the opportunity to
decide on its merits." 74
67. Exchange Act, § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1995).
68. See Forward and Executive Summary to Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, at 285 (1 PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. B-1104, 1999).
69. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 23.
70. See id. at 24.
71. See Ingrid Depser, Amended EC Proposal for a 13th Council Directive No. on
Company Law Concerning Takeovers and other General Bids, 19 INT'L BuS. LAW. 483, 484
(1991).
72. See Jonathan Brayne, Tender Offers Involving UK Companies, 21 REV. SEC &
COMM. REG. 67, 70 (Apr. 27, 1988).
73. See Simon MacLachian & William Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in
Europe-Practicability, Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373, 387-
88 (1989).
74. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CIrY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL AcQuIsIToNs OF SHARES, General
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Initially, the draft of the Thirteenth Directive on Company
Law was concerned with the equal treatment of the parties involved
in takeovers and the transparency of corporate takeovers while a
takeover bid was in progress.75 It was patterned after the City Code
to some extent. There was a provision for a mandatory bid once a
threshold position of one-third of the voting shares were acquired.
Also controlling target-company shareholders would have been
required to act in the interests of all shareholders by not frustrating
the bid.
Since capital formation depends upon equity capital in the
U.K. there is a constant monitoring of management performance,
protection of minority shareholders, and efficient resource allocation.
On the continent, as exemplified by Germany, management is given a
long-term mandate, its first duty is to the business, and then the
employees and the company's bankers. Further, there is stable and
knowledgeable ownership of business with close ties to banks.76
Given this difference, the British regarded takeovers as the ultimate
discipline over bad management, whereas the Germans considered
hostile bids as inimical to three ingredients of their post-war
success-management's ability to take the long-term view,
harmonious labor relations, and the disciplinary function of German
banks. Accordingly, German law countenanced numerous barriers to
hostile takeovers.77 Because the Germans and other continentals
believed that the Thirteenth Directive adopted the pro-takeover
underpinnings of the U.K. system, they opposed it. The British also
opposed it because they did not wish to see their self-regulatory
system replaced by a statutory system.
However, the European Commission believed that there was a
need to facilitate the restructuring of European companies to meet
international competition, so an amended version of the Thirteenth
Directive was put forth.78 By this time, takeover activity had
increased to some extent and the need for shareholder protection had
become more apparent.79 The amended Thirteen Directive required
Principle 7, at B-2 (9th ed. 1996).
75. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids, supra note 60, at 8.
76. See David Chamy, The German Corporate Governance System, 1998 COLUM.
Bus. L. Rnv. 145, 151-57 (1998).
77. See Depser, supra note 71, at484.
78. See Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids, supra note 60, at 9.
79. See Lois Moore, The EC's Proposed Takeover Directives, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1991,
at 1. Takeover activity has continued to increase. See Merger Monday, ECONOMIST, Oct.
18, 1997, at 61.
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each Member State to designate a supervisory authority to put the
Directive into effect, a requirement that previously had been included
in the EU Insider Trading Directive.8" There was provision for
mutual recognition.81
The amended Thirteenth Directive fared no better in
achieving acceptance and a consensus in favor of adopting it than the
original proposed directive. In 1997 a new and streamlined proposal
for a takeover directive was put forward by the European
Commission. 2 This proposal takes into account the subsidiarity
principle and leaves Member States some latitude in deciding how to
achieve the goals of the directive. The Directive would apply to
securities traded on a regulated market of a company governed by the
law of an EU Member State.
Nevertheless, the general principles of the Thirteenth
Directive that would have to be followed in national law are
unchanged. They are that holders of securities in target companies
who are in the same position must be treated equally, the addressees
of a bid must have sufficient time and information to enable them to
reach a properly informed decision, the board of an offeree company
must act in the interests of the company as a whole, false markets
must not be created in the securities of companies involved in a bid,
and target companies must not be hindered in the conduct of their
business beyond a reasonable time. Further, national rules would
have to be established for a decision to bid to be made public once
the supervisory authority and target company are notified and the
bidder would be required to draft a disclosure document and submit it
to the supervisory authority. The Directive recognizes that prompt
announcement of an intention to launch a takeover bid reduces
opportunities for insider trading. The target company board would
be prohibited from taking action to affect the success of the bid after
receiving notification of the bid. Rules would have to be published
on withdrawal or nullity of bids, revision of bids, treatment of
competing bids, and disclosure of the outcome. Whether mandatory
bids would be required at any point would be left to the laws of the
Member States.
80. The supervisory authorities were then given the mandate to assure, among other
things, that holders of securities in the target company would be treated equally; target
company shareholders would have time and information to reach an informed decision on
the bid and the target company board would not frustrate the bid. Mandatory bid provisions
and mandated disclosure in offering documents also were specified. See Amended
Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids, art. 6(a), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 2, 6.
81. Seeid. art. 6(3).
82. See 1997 O.J. (C 378) 11.
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The twice amended Directive remains an anathema to the
British who fear that, despite the recognition of the Takeover Panel
as a proper supervisory authority, it would change the workings of
the Panel by tangling its operations in endless legal challenges.83 The
prospects for adoption of the Thirteenth Directive are therefore
murky.
E. Financial Intermediaries
A fourth group of directives addresses the regulation of
financial intermediaries. The Second Banking Directive84 established
a legal framework for a single banking market in the EU that began
on January 1, 1993. It provides that a bank established and licensed
in one EU Member State may provide financial services throughout
the EU without obtaining additional regulatory approvals in other EU
states. This right to establish branches in other EU countries, and to
market and sell services in any country directly, without being
required to obtain a license from the host country, is often referred to
as the single passport. Although banks are subject to home rather
than host country control, minimum capital adequacy and other
standards are set forth in the Second Banking Directive as a predicate
for mutual recognition.
The UCITS Directive8" sets forth minimum standards for
Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities.
The effect of the directive is that any closed-end investment fund
within an EU Member State that complies with EU minimum
standards and has been duly authorized by the appropriate home
country regulator can be freely marketed throughout the EU without
prior authorization of the host country. The Third Life Directives86
provides a passport for life insurance companies but has
accomplished little with regard to liberalizing cross border securities
investment. A Pension Funds Directive has yet to be adopted.87
83. See More Talks on Defining Takeover Bids Directive, EuR. REP., Jan. 19, 1999;
Euro-takeovers, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1997, at 17.
84. Council Directive 1989 No. 89/646, O.J. (L 386) 1, amended by 92/30, 1992 O.J.
(L 110) 52, amendedby 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1, amended by 95/26, 1995 O.J. (L 168) 7.
85. Council Directive No. 88/220, 1998 O.J. (L 100) 31.
86. Council Directive No. 92/49, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1 amended by Council Directive
No. 95/26, 1995 O.J. (L 168) 7, (reinforcing prudential supervision); Council Directive No.
92/96, 1992 O.J. (L 360) 1, amended by Council Directive No. 95/26, O.J. (L 168) 7,
(reinforcing prudential supervision).
87. The Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Freedom of Management and
Investment of Funds Held by Institutions for Retirement Provision was withdrawn. 1993
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The ISD88 establishes a single passport for securities firms
and minimum standards for regulation of stock exchanges. The
related Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)89 establishes financial
responsibility requirements for securities firms. The ISD is intended
to allow investment firms to open branches and offer services on a
cross border basis. It provides a common licensing requirement
among the member states, mutual recognition of the license granted
in the home state by all other member (or host) states and guiding
principles for conduct of business rules. However, the ISD did not
result in any meaningful harmonization of conduct of business rules
because Article 11(2) provided that implementation and supervision
of compliance with rules of conduct should remain the responsibility
of the host state.
Leaving such powers to host member states is a clear
departure from mutual recognition' principles.9" In addition, it is
unclear how conduct of business rules should be enforced when an
investment firm conducts business transnationally without opening a
branch in a state other than its host state. It can be argued that in
such a situation, the conduct of business rules of the home state
should apply.91 But this interpretation would undermine the political
compromise embodied in Article 11(2). Furthermore, if an aggrieved
investor were to bring an action in the host state, there would be a
misalignment of civil and regulatory jurisdiction, and an
extraterritorial application of home county law.92
Another important gap in the ISD relates to its provisions
concerning stock exchanges. The directive contains a number of
provisions applicable to "regulated markets." These include a
requirement for listings to be conducted in accordance with the
listing directive, a reporting requirement to a competent authority for
transactions, whether effected on or off a regulated market,
transparency requirements, an optimal concentration requirement and
O.J. (C 171) 11 and a Communication on Pension Funds, 1994 O.J. (C 360) 7 was annulled.
See also Case C-57195, French Republic v. Commission, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7314
(1997). See generally LocalAnswer for Pension Reform, FIN TIMES, May 30, 1998, at 9.
88. Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, No. 93/22, 1993
O.J. (L 141) 27 corrected 1993 O.J. (L 170) 32 and 1993 O.J. (L 194) 27.
89. Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit
Institutions, No. 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1.
90. See Gerard Hertig, Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services, 14
INT'L REv. L. &EcoN., 177, 181 (1994).
91. See Christopher Cruickshank, Is There A Need to Harmonize Conduct of Business
Rules?, in EUROPEAN SECUPmS MARKETS, supra note 52, at 131, 132-33.
92. See Johannes K6ndgen, Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonisation?, in EUROPEAN
SECURrriEs MARKETS, supra note 52, at 115, 126.
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a provision for cooperation among the regulated markets. Due to the
inability of the European stock exchanges and governments to agree
to a market structure model, the ISD almost failed and required so
much flexibility of implementation to gain approval that it does not
provide a standard for pan-European exchange trading. In large part,
these disagreements were the product of competition between SEAQ
International in London and continental exchanges for trading
volume in non-U.K. stocks, but the continental exchanges have
reclaimed some of this trading volume, and the advent of remote
membership and electronic trading may make this rivalry moot.93
In addition to its failure to come to grips with transparency
requirements, the ISD does not provide a comprehensive approach to
many issues that arise in the regulation of markets, for example the
need for an exchange to be licensed, to have adequate financial
resources, to run proper markets, to have adequate monitoring and
enforcement, to provide satisfactory arrangement for clearance and
settlement and to cooperate with regulators.94 In addition, the ISD
does not address the very difficult question of when a securities firm
or facility should be required to register as a "regulated market."9"
The European Commission has recognized that the ISD is in
urgent need of upgrading.96 Further, new technologies require
European wide definitions of what is a "regulated market" or an
exchange and a common approach to the authorization and
supervision of alternative trading systems.97 Such regulation would
be in accord with IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation that recommend that the establishment of trading systems,
including exchanges, be subject to regulatory authority and oversight,
and to ongoing supervision.98
93. See Ailsa Rrell, Competition among European Exchanges: Recent Developments,
in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 52, at 213, 214-18. See also A New Broom
for Europe's Capital Markets, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994 at 75.
94. See Andrew Whittaker, A European Law for Regulated Markets? Some Personal
Views, in EUROPEAN SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 52, at 269, 270-71.
95. The SEC has engaged in a lengthy rulemaking effort to attempt to distinguish
proprietary or alternative trading systems from exchanges. Although this has been
recognized as an issue in Europe there is little consensus as to how it should be handled.
Compare Fabrice Demarigny, A European Directive for Regulated Markets? A French
Reaction, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 52, at 275, 280-82 with Ruben
Lee, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? THE AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS 295-316 (1998) [hereinafter WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE?]
96. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 5.
97. See id. at 6.
98. See THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, supra note 68.
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F. European Securities Exchanges and Regulators
Before the mid-1980s European equity markets were
structured the way they had been in the nineteenth century.
Continental exchanges featured call auction markets with open outcry
dealing where publicly licensed single-capacity intermediaries
conveyed customers' orders and were compensated by statutorily
fixed commissions. In London, stock trading was managed by
dealers who received orders through single capacity brokers, and
commissions were fixed by the exchange.99 Stock exchanges were
closed membership organizations, sheltered from competition by
national regulation. ' °  In general, stock exchange listing
requirements established public company disclosure standards
although some countries introduced government supervision of
company disclosure prior to the 1986 Single European Act.10 1 The
stock exchanges also established and enforced conduct of market
trading rules. The degree of government intervention varied. Three
different patterns have been catalogued. In the U.K., Ireland and the
Netherlands, regulation was primarily self-regulatory and the
government merely provided some legal backing for the regulatory
apparatus. In Latin European states, such as France and Italy, the
stock exchanges were government owned but they had negotiated
considerable self-regulation which was then rubber stamped by
government. In Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, the
government was involved in certain areas, but not others. 2
International competition, technological developments and a
shift in political preferences led to changes in stock exchange
structure and regulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Commission rates
were unfixed, single capacity was eliminated, exchange floors
disappeared and new marketplaces in the form of proprietary trading
systems were launched. Stock exchanges became limited companies
owned by their members, in contrast to state owned organizations.
Cross border stock exchange linkages were introduced. More
government securities regulation came into force, partly as the result
of the Insider Trading Directive and the ISD and partly for other
reasons such as government privatization of state owned utilities and
99. See Marco Pagano, The Changing Microstructure of European Equity Markets, in
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 52, at 177, 178.
100. See id.
101. Belgium had had such regulation since 1935. Luxembourg introduced it in 1965,
France in 1967 and Italy in 1974. Eddy Wymeersch, The Implementation of the 1SD and
CAD in National Legal Systems, in EUROPEAN SECurrIES MARKETS, supra note 52, at 3, 6.
102. See id.
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other enterprises.° 3
Implementation of the ISD, the CAD and Insider Trading
Directives confronted EU member states with the problem of
deciding which government agency should oversee and regulate
securities firms and markets, in particular whether such oversight
should be assigned to banking regulatory authorities or securities
commissions. In many jurisdictions prudential supervision was given
to the bank authorities, but other regulatory responsibilities were
given to existing, reformed, or newly organized securities
commissions.10 4 Because of the political difficulties of allocating
responsibilities with respect to securities regulation, the ISD was not
promptly implemented. The last country to do so was Spain in
1998.'05
The result of these developments was that national securities
commissions were strengthened, investor protection became a greater
priority than had previously been the case and many new laws and
regulations were promulgated. These trends are likely to continue
because of ongoing privatization of enterprise, the need to create
alternative retirement vehicles to unfunded pension systems and the
need to retire the aging capital of the generation that created the post
World War II economic resurgence of Europe."16
Creating an equity culture requires a regime of investor
protection. But without further harmonization of securities laws, new
and more vigorously enforced securities regulations will impose a
serious burden on financial intermediaries required to comply with
different regulations in different jurisdictions. Furthermore,
securities trading has become globalized and stock exchanges
conduct business in a manner that transcends national boundaries.
Whether national conduct of business rules will sufficiently protect
investors involved in cross border trading is problematic. Also, there
is a need for cross border surveillance of securities markets by
103. See Pagano, supra note 99, at 178-204.
104. The concept of a bank lead supervisor is recognized internationally in the Basle
Concordat issued by the Basle Committee in 1983, and supplemented in 1990 and 1992.
Because banks are subject to consolidated supervision, enforcement of the CAD was
generally given to banking supervisors. See George Graham, BIS Weighs Expanded Role,
FIN. TimEs, June 9, 1997, at 4; Peter Marsh, Central Banks Act on Fraud: Guidelines
Designed to Prevent Repeat of BCCI Disaster, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1992, at 2; Robert
Preston, Bank Seeks Tougher Standards, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at 10; Richard Dale,
Someone Must Be in Charge, FIN. TimEs, July 22, 1991, at 12.
105. See George Graham, The Stock Exchange, Beyond The Storm, Small Will Be
Beautiful, With Frankfurt and London Tying up Big Business, the Bolsa May Need to
Specialise, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at 2.
106. See Pagano, supra note 99, at 203-04.
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regulators and pan-European clearance and settlement systems.
While much can be accomplished through the cooperation of national
securities regulators, a European securities market will require a pan-
European securities regulator.
III. RULE BY A EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
A. Why a Commission is Needed
The principle of subsidiarity embodied in the TEU would
militate against the establishment of a European SEC if the objectives
of securities regulation could be sufficiently achieved at the national
level. °7 The problem with securities regulation, however, is that it is
derived from, and to some extent continues to be, self-regulation
formulated and enforced by stock exchanges. Further, European
stock exchanges compete with one another as marketplaces for the
trading of securities. They do cooperate in certain ways, but they
compete with regard to liquidity, transparency and cost.0 8 Also, they
compete for listings, including new products. Stock exchanges in
Europe have already been privatized and now they are being
demutalized.'019 Some have and others may become listed companies.
All of these developments involve conflicts of interest that stand in
the way of an integrated European regulatory system for a pan-
European equity market.
Whether the introduction of the euro will result in the demise
of some European stock exchanges remains to be seen."' While joint
ventures and mergers among various exchanges are in the planning
stages, there are numerous obstacles to their successful fruition.
Mutual companies are difficult to merge and the merger of a mutual
company and a limited company is even more difficult. If, for
example, the London, Frankfurt and Paris exchanges merged, what
disclosure and accounting standards would apply to their listed
companies? What regulator would surveil trading and enforce
insider trading and similar laws? What regulatory system and what
civil law system would protect investors? The mixture of public and
private law applicable to securities trading makes the harmonization
of standards for investor protection difficult. Traditional concepts of
107. See TEU, supra note 20, art. 3b.
108. See Marco Onado, Competition among Exchanges or Financial Systems?, in
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 52, at 225, 228.
109. See Arlman, supra note 57, at 141.
110. See Onado, supra note 108, at 229.
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jurisdiction do not easily apply to Internet and other computerized
trading systems for securities."'
Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have become
international, just like trading markets. The problems of
uncoordinated regulatory supervision have been amply demonstrated
in recent bank failures. 1 2 There has not been a stock market decline
since 1987 requiring regulatory intervention.'1 3 But as governments
encourage an equity culture by privatizing enterprise through public
offerings and suggesting that retirement savings be invested in
equities, government regulators will be forced to assume more of a
stake in the stability of financial intermediaries and equity markets
and to ensure investor protection.
Opponents of a European SEC argue that private market
incentives will find and maintain an optimal level of investor
protection. 14 However, the real question for the future is whether the
newly empowered national securities regulators in Europe will be
willing and able to establish a harmonized regulatory structure or
whether a pan-European securities commission would be better able
to do the job. Just as the euro required the establishment of a
European Central Bank, a pan-European equity market will require a
European SEC. Furthermore, without a European SEC, such a pan-
European market may never come into existence. The rivalries
between the London, Paris, Frankfurt and other stock exchanges are
too strong and there is not a sufficient European tradition of investor
protection to overcome the opposition of financial intermediaries to
more rigorous regulation. There remain too many barriers to cross-
border investment by insurance companies and pension funds.
Solving all of these problems through the process of
formulating directives is impractical. It takes much too long for
directives to be negotiated and then implemented. The capital
markets are creative and dynamic. This is one reason why self-
regulation has worked well for the securities industry, despite its
111. See Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,
485 (1997), at 30521-30 (June 4, 1997) [hereinafter Concept Release].
112. See Richard Dale, Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective,
26 INT'L LAW. 949 (1992); Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of
Financial Risks and International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from
the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAW. 301, 309-16 (1996).
113. In 1987, the market break in the U.S. triggered similar declines all around the
world. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) Special Report No. 1267, at 9-14 (Jan. 12, 1988).
114. See Benn Steil, The ISD and the Regulation of European Market Structure, in THE
EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE
MILLENNIUM 113, 136-37 (1996); Whittaker, supra note 94, at 269,273.
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inherent limitations. Transferring oversight of the self-regulatory
process to fifteen different national securities regulators will not
result in a pan-European securities market, but rather will compound
the problems of a fragmented system for the trading and regulation of
securities. A central, flexible regulator that could deal directly with
the markets and financial intermediaries could provide more
appropriate and better oversight. In addition, the need to harmonize
U.S. and European securities regulation11 could perhaps be
accomplished more easily by a single European regulator working
with the U.S. SEC than by fifteen different negotiators.
B. What a Commission Should Do
1. Jurisdiction
A European SEC would probably resemble the U.S. SEC to
some extent, but it would come into existence at a different time in
the development of the capital markets and in the context of a
different political and legal system. Engineers of a European SEC
should learn from the mistakes as well as the successes of the U.S.
model. For example, it is probably not politically feasible or even
desirable for a European SEC to be the primary regulator for banks as
well as securities firms, yet European banks have historically been
the dominant players on European stock exchanges, so some degree
of functional regulation of banks probably would be desirable."1 6
Similarly, while a European SEC need not necessarily regulate
insurance companies, it should take an active role in dismantling
current barriers to cross border investment and mergers by insurance
companies. On the other hand, it would be foolish to separate the
regulation of equity and derivatives markets as is now the case in the
United States, but is not currently the case in Europe.11 7
115. See Adman, supra note 57, at 146-47.
116. See Cam F. Justice, Note, The European Market: Creating a Unified Competitive
Banking System, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 741, 754-56 (1996). The areas where a
European SEC could appropriately regulate banks are with regard to manipulative trading
and customer protection. However, there would be no reason for a European SEC to assume
responsibility for bank safety and soundness or capital adequacy regulation.
117. See Lugar Says Banking Agencies, Not CFTC, May Be Appropriate Derivatives
Regulators, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), at 1785, Dec. 18, 1998.
[38:9
A EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
2. Disclosure Policy
One of the most important areas that a European SEC should
regulate is financial disclosure. The EU directives regarding
corporate disclosure and accounting principles have not succeeded in
creating a sound legal environment for initial public offerings of
small and midsized companies or for cross border listings on
European stock exchanges. Investors need consistency and
comparability in financial statement presentations and timely
disclosure of material corporate events. This is why EASDAQ and
the EURO.NM markets require their listed companies to reconcile
their financial statements to U.S. GAAP or IAS. But even if the
IASC completes its monumental task of establishing a set of
international accounting principles, IAS will not become a reality
unless it is recognized by the world's primary securities regulators.
Further, as time passes, these IAS principles will require
interpretation and change as well as enforcement. In addition, there
is a need for international auditing standards for public companies. A
European SEC could perform an important role in exercising
oversight of private sector accounting bodies and giving a European
input to the work of the IASC. Such input could give the IASC more
credibility within Europe as a European SEC could counterbalance
the influence of the U.S. SEC. At the same time, a European SEC
could negotiate regulatory policies with the U.S. SEC more
effectively than fifteen different securities regulators can.
A European SEC also should have a role in establishing and
enforcing harmonized annual and periodic disclosures by public
companies, as well as disclosures when companies make public
offerings. Firms do not appear to have the incentives to voluntarily
make the disclosures investors require. 8 Although the European
Commission determined that an Insider Trading Directive was
necessary, and such a directive was subsequently implemented in all
of the EU countries, the connection between the ban on insider
trading and prompt public disclosure of material corporate events
generally has not been made.
A European SEC also could be the repository for reports
issued pursuant to the major shareholdings Directive and any
disclosures made in connection with takeovers, especially if the
Thirteenth Directive is ever passed. Full and fair disclosure can be
an alternative to regulation, particularly if disclosures made are
promptly and effectively disseminated.
118. See Onado, supra note 108, at 240-41.
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3. Market Structure
Issues of market structure are highly contentious and it is not
immediately clear or universally agreed that governments should be
involved in designing securities trading markets.'1 9 When a financial
intermediary executes trades as an agent, best execution is imposed
by laws covering fiduciary duty.'20 But when an intermediary acts as
principal or dealer it is less clear that a customer is covered by
fiduciary duty law.' Further, the customer may be willing to pay a
larger spread or commission to obtain immediate liquidity. Yet, in
any regime where investor protection is an important value, the
ability of a customer to obtain best execution is an important
regulatory principle. For these reasons, a European SEC would have
to focus on issues of transparency and access, even though
appropriate regulatory standards acceptable to the various EU
member states might be very difficult to formulate. One difficulty
would be that this could involve a European SEC in direct or indirect
regulation of banks, insurance companies and investment funds. This
type of regulation is, and likely will remain, the province of other
regulators.
An important function of a European SEC would be to police
financial intermediaries for manipulative and anticompetitive
practices. The Insider Trading Directive is one type of manipulative
activity already addressed, but other kinds of fraudulent trading
activities have been common in stock markets from time to time. 122
Further, since in the past the pricing mechanism for a particular
security has tended to gravitate to one exchange, even where
securities are dually listed, the so-called natural monopoly created
has led to anticompetitive trading activities.'23 While such practices
could be addressed by the EU Commission as part of its
anticompetition mandate, a more specialized approach by a European
119. For a strong argument that they should not be so involved see WHAT Is AN
EXCHANGE?, supra note 95, at 260-61, 264-65, 308-09.
120. See Division of Market Regulation, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, MARKET 2000 AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS, at V-1 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000].
121. See id. See also E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, [1988-89
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303 (July 6, 1988).
122. These include manipulation of securities prices, false and misleading statements by
public companies and their officers and directors, and churning and other forms of
overreaching by securities firms. See VII-VIII Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3510-25, 3874-79, 3939-85 (3d ed. 1989).
123. See MARKET 2000, supra note 120, at rn-8-11; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SECURITIES TRADING-SEC ACTION NEEDED To ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
ISSUES 18-32 (1990).
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SEC might be more appropriate and more effective.124
With the advent of alternative or proprietary trading systems
it is quite possible that the nature of securities trading will change the
pricing mechanisms for securities trading. Whether such systems
should be treated as regulated markets under the ISD or some other
type of financial intermediary is a question a European SEC would
have to confront. 125
4. Market Stability
One reason it is important to distinguish between stock
exchanges or regulated markets and other types of financial
intermediaries is because of the need for prudential rules. The CAD
sets forth capital requirements for securities firms, but the ISD does
not set forth capital requirements for regulated markets. In times of
financial stress it is important that financial regulators have some
power and responsibility to assure that regulated markets will have
the capability to continue to function. 126
Related to this challenge is the need to eliminate the undue
and unnecessary risks of inadequate, inefficient or inappropriate
clearance and settlement systems. While regulators may not be in as
good a position as private enterprise to design effective clearance and
settlement systems, they do not have the conflict of interest that
arises because financial intermediaries profit from certain kinds of
inefficiencies in trading and clearance and settlement systems.1 27
124. In the United States, the securities industry has a limited exemption from the
antitrust laws necessary to make the securities laws work. Although antitrust cases have
been brought against securities industry participants, these have been resolved as a practical
matter by the SEC. See, e.g., Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release No.
37,542 (Aug. 8, 1990); Michael Schroeder, Fines on 28 Securities Firms Mark End to
Nasdaq Trading Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1999, at B6.
125. The U.S. SEC has been struggling with this question and has analyzed the
problems at length. See Concept Release, supra note 111.
126. See id. at 30497.
127. This is because securities firms and banks profit from their ability to leverage cash
balances and securities they hold for third parties. See Richard Waters, Europe Extends the
Fuse Leading to Big Bang, FIN. TIMES, May 29, 1991, at 21. Following the 1987 market
break, the G-30 determined that to contain risk in the global marketplace, the settlement
cycle should be shortened, trade guarantees should be promoted and the simultaneous
exchange of monies and securities should be assured. They also found that efficiency could
be improved by providing book-entry settlement, netting systems, and standardized
communications and settlement schedules. The Group adopted nine recommendations to
this end. See U.S. WORKING COMMrrEE GROUP OF THIRTY, CLEARANCE & SETTLEMENT
PROJECT, IMPLEMENTING THE GROUP OF THIRTY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
at 11-1-2 (1990). A decade later much remains to be accomplished and European stock
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Some regulatory oversight by a European SEC of clearance and
settlement systems could be helpful in achieving an efficient and
workable pan-European securities market that is not fraught with
systemic risk.
5. Forum for Investor Protection
Private litigation as a mechanism for enforcing investor
protection is not as readily available in Europe as in the United
States. However, it is difficult to achieve an equity culture without
effective investor protection, including the opportunity for civil
redress and a forum for articulating standards of best practices.
Litigation under the federal securities laws in the United States has
been subject to some serious abuses and remedial legislation to
address these problems has recently been enacted."2 8 In view of the
multiplicity of jurisdictions involved and the expense of ordinary
civil litigation, a pan-European arbitration system, similar to that
operated by the securities industry in the United States might be one
way to achieve a forum for investor protection without the costs of
civil litigation.'29 Alternatively, a mechanism for redress similar to
CFTC reparations proceedings might be feasible. 3 '
Even if a European SEC were not to become involved in
enforcing the rights of investors, it could play an important role in
articulating standards for investor protection. The ISD has not done
so and this is a significant impediment to equity investment in a pan-
European market. Furthermore, in order to solve some of the
problems of pay as you go social security systems by encouraging
private equity investment, better investor protection mechanisms
should be considered by European governments.'
The European Commission has recognized that consumer
uncertainties regarding redress in contractual disputes is a significant
exchanges do not have an integrated clearance and settlement system. See Randall D.
Guynn, Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws, 1996 CAPITAL MARKETS F. Y.B.
(International Bar Association) 343-398.
128. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-47, 109 Stat.
737 (1995); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998).
129. See Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better For Investors Than the
Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1503 (1996).
130. See Jerry W. Markham, The Seventh Amendment and CFTC Reparations
Proceedings, 68 IOWAL. REv. 87, 94-103 (1982).
131. The author has analyzed these problems at length in Roberta S. Karmel, The
Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security Privatization, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 1043 (1998).
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stumbling block to the achievement of a single financial market. 132
Accordingly, efficient and effective judicial and extra-judicial dispute
settlement mechanisms need to be developed.133 Therefore, the
European Commission has recommended the development of an EU-
wide complaints network.'34 Without a European SEC to police and
participate in the enforcement of investor grievances, however, it is
unlikely that such a complaints network would have sufficient
credibility to promote the investor confidence necessary for cross-
border investment.
6. Surveillance, Investigation and Co-Operation with Foreign
and Bank Regulators
In globalized capital markets, many violations of securities
laws are transnational. This means that unless national laws are
given extraterritorial effect, there will be inadequate law
enforcement, but if laws are applied extraterritorially, there will be
conflict between regulators and confusion on the part of regulated
persons as to what are the proper rules. Not only does the substantive
law differ in various EU member states, but the law regarding
extraterritoriality differs, as well.
For example, in the United Kingdom, individuals are not
guilty of the offense of dealing on insider information unless they
were within the United Kingdom at the time they were alleged to
have done any act constituting or forming part of the alleged dealing
or the dealing was alleged to have occurred on a U.K. regulated
market. Further, individuals are not guilty of encouraging or
disclosing insider information unless they were either within the
United Kingdom when they were alleged to have disclosed the
information or encouraged the dealing, or the recipient of the
information was within the United Kingdom when the information or
encouragement was transmitted.135
In Germany, the territorial scope of the criminal sanctions is
governed by the Penal Guide.136 Criminal sanctions for insider
trading apply to: violations committed within Germany; violations
committed abroad against a German victim, provided that the act
132. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 10.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993, §62 (Eng.).
136. See Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL
INSIDER DEALING 140 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh, eds., 1996).
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constitutes a criminal offence at the place where committed; and
violations committed in a foreign country if the act constitutes a
criminal offense in that country, if committed by a German citizen or
by a foreigner who is found in Germany and not extradited.'37
A European SEC would alleviate these problems to the extent
that substantive standards were harmonized at the EU level and the
commission were given some powers of enforcement. If national
regulators were to retain enforcement powers, however, the European
SEC could still play a role in the surveillance of the capital markets
and in the coordination of the investigation of questionable or illegal
activities by national regulators.
Securities regulators do not have a long history of mutual
cooperation and the coordination of investigative activities that bank
regulators have long enjoyed. Nevertheless, many securities
regulators now have exchanged Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) and cooperate extensively with regard to their investigative
activities.138 Further, they meet with some frequency in connection
with the work of IOSCO and regulators within Europe have formed
the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO). A
European SEC could play a constructive role in making FESCO a
viable and effective organization for harmonizing regulation and
assuring enforcement cooperation by a European SEC.139 In addition,
a European SEC could coordinate appropriate policies and
enforcement activities with European banking regulators and the
European Central Bank.
Also of importance would be the ability of a European SEC to
cooperate with securities regulators and other bodies outside of
Europe. Today, there are at least fifteen different government voices
speaking on regulatory issues on behalf of Europe and another group
of self-regulators taking positions on various issues. This does not
give Europe the effectiveness with respect to international issues that
137. See id. at 140-41.
138. See International Agreements and Understandings for the Production of
Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 INT'L LAw. 780, 823-26 (1995). The
European Commission and the U.S. SEC issued a Joint Statement on the Establishment of
Improved Cooperation in September 1991 and the U.S. has MOUs with most European
securities regulators. Joint Statement on the Establishment of Improved Cooperation
Between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commision of the
European Communities, SEC Int'l Series, Release No. IS-320, 49 SEC Docket 1461 (Sept.
30, 1991). See also Michael Lemer, FESCO to Ink European MOU to Speed Up Cross-
Border Enforcement, INSTUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 5, 1998, at 1.
139. See FESCO's Wittich Stresses Need to Focus on Business Conduct Rules, INT'L
SEC. REG. REP., Oct. 8, 1998, at 12; Michael Lerner, Euro-Regulators Aim For More
Uniformity in Conduct of Biz Regime, INSTrTTIONAL INVESTOR, June 29, 1998, at 1;
Securities Regulators Start Euro Forum, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 29, 1997, at 2.
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it would have if a European SEC existed. Further, if the European
capital markets become integrated, the size and strength of a pan-
European equity market would make a European SEC a significant
and effective negotiator on issues of policy and law enforcement.
7. Prudent Investor Rules
Despite the principle of free movement of capital many EU
member states have prudent investor rules that restrict cross border
investments by pension funds and insurance companies. Some of
these rules prohibit pension funds or insurance companies from
investing more than a certain percentage of their assets in foreign
securities.14 Other rules prohibit more than a certain percentage of
assets in equities, or require that a certain percentage be invested in
domestic government bonds.141 Furthermore, some governments seek
to balance their budget deficits by tapping the assets of pension funds
to invest in government bonds or to invest in domestic industries.142
Cross-border investment of pension fund and insurance company
assets cannot increase if national governments refuse to relinquish
their control over the regulation of investments. A reluctance to do
so led to the defeat of the Pension Funds Directive.
Nevertheless, prudent investor rules for pension funds and
insurance companies are important for assuring the ability of such
financial intermediaries to meet their obligations. Scandals involving
the improper investment of retirement savings have made regulators
cautious about abandoning prudent investor rules. 143  Furthermore,
such worries will increase if European governments are forced to
supplement pay as you go government pensions with supplemental
private sector pensions because of the aging of European
populations.1
A European SEC could facilitate cross-border investment of
140. See ECMI Report Examines Barriers to European Market Integration, 2 WORLD
SEC. L. REP. (BNA) at 20, 21 (1996). Outside the Cocoon, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at
72.
141. See Outside the Cocoon, supra note 140.
142. See Gillian Tett & David Owen, Brussels Approves French Budget Plan, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1996, at 18; Barry Riley, Pension Fund As Financier To Public Sector
Deficit, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at21.
143. See Steve Stecklow & Sara Calian, Financial Flop: Social Security Switch In UK.
Is Disastrous; A Caution to the US.?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al; Supplementary
Pensions in the Single Market: Green Paper from the EC, COM(97) 283 final at 10.
144. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 13, at 25-29; Craig R. Whitney, In Europe, Too,
Social Security Isn't So Secure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, at E4.
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pension and life insurance assets by formulating European-wide
prudent investor rules and establishing capital adequacy rules for
such financial intermediaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
As an American comfortable with securities regulation at the
federal level, the author has a perspective that is at odds with the
approach to securities regulation in Europe, where it is generally felt
there is no need for a common EU securities supervisory body.145
Yet, the U.S. SEC can rightly claim some responsibility for the size
and strength of the U.S. equity markets. A common currency should
foster a pan-European equity market, but fostering sufficient investor
confidence in such a market to create an equity culture is a significant
challenge.
Up to now the British have not believed it was in their
national interest to have a European SEC created, and London has the
largest capital market in Europe.146 Further, the French and other
continental countries believe EU securities initiatives are too "Anglo-
Saxon and self-regulatory." '147 This impasse was at the heart of the
controversies over the ISD and probably will stand in the way of the
establishment of a European SEC for the immediate future. The most
the European Commission has been willing to recommend is a
Securities Committee of an advisory nature.148 The European
Commission has endorsed the creation of FESCO, but has not
recommended the creation of a European SEC.'49 Rather, the
European Commission has adopted a wait and see attitude, stating
that in time, "the option of a single authority to oversee securities
markets supervision may emerge as a meaningful proposition in the
light of changing market reality."'50 But political positions, like the
capital markets, can change quickly if circumstances create a climate
for change. If pressed, many European securities regulators probably
145. See Comprehensive Strategy Unveiled for European Union Financial Services, 30
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1575, Oct. 30, 1998. But see Ruben Lee, Securities
Regulation in the EC: Some Problems and Solutions, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Aug. 24, 1993,
at 9; Europe's Exchange and Mart, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1998 at 14.
146. See Whittaker, supra note 94.
147. See Comprehensive Strategy Unveiled, supra note 145.
148. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15.
149. See id. at 14.
150. Id.
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would concede that the creation of a European securities commission
is needed and will occur in due course.

